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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 11-2632 
_________ 
 
 
DARNELL PITTMAN, SR., 
                                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
B. A. BLEDSOE 
                   
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-00645) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
_______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
and STENGEL,*
 
 District Judge 
(Filed: February 17, 2012) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
 
 
STENGEL, District Judge. 
                                              
* Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
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 Darnell Pittman appeals from an Order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying two petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The petitions involve disciplinary proceedings stemming 
from two separate incidents that occurred in 2009, while Pittman was incarcerated at the 
U.S. Penitentiary – Canaan.  For the reasons below, we will affirm. 
 In the first incident, Pittman was charged with “assaulting any person.”  According 
to the associated incident report, a correctional officer was injured while trying to un-cuff 
Pittman through the food slot box of his cell.  The report provides the following details: 
While on duty as SHU 4 officer I was assisting in 
escorting inmate Pittman back to his cell.  Inmate Pittman 
was asked to place his hands and wrists through the 
wicket to remove the handcuff restraints upon entering 
cell 101.  After removing the first cuff on inmate 
Pittman’s left hand he violently pulled away from the 
wicket with his right hand and pulled me toward the 
wicket ripping the handcuffs out of my hand.  The 
handcuff key was broken off inside the handcuffs.   
 
 In the second incident, Pittman was charged with “assaulting any person” and 
“insolence towards a staff member,” while being escorted from a suicide watch cell to a 
dental examination.  The associated incident report indicates: 
On 2-11-2009 at approximately 9:20 AM while 
restraining i/m Pittman, D. #30282-160 in preparation to 
take him from suicide watch cell to the dental area for a 
dental examination he told LT. Trentley he had to use the 
rest room.  I/m Pittman had his blanket wrapped around 
his waist.  I removed the blanket before placing him in 
the restroom and as the door was being shut he turned 
around and called me a nigger and spit on me.  I was spat 
on my face and upper chest.   
 In his habeas petitions, Pittman argued that (1) he was denied procedural due 
process because he was not provided a preliminary hearing before the Unit Disciplinary 
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Committee, or a disciplinary hearing before a Disciplinary Hearing Officer; (2) these 
denials of hearings prevented him from presenting witness testimony and certain 
documentary evidence; and (3) he has been prejudiced because he was sanctioned with a 
loss of twenty-seven days of good time, he received thirty days of disciplinary 
segregation, and a loss of commissary privileges for 180 days.   
 In its response to the petitions, the Bureau of Prisons presented evidence in an 
attempt to establish that Pittman had not been denied those hearings, but rather refused to 
attend them.  In fact, the Bureau insisted that Pittman not only refused to attend the 
hearings, he refused to sign the waiver of attendance when presented with it in his cell.  
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the petitions 
be denied, which the District Court declined to adopt, finding that certain reports in the 
record were inconsistent and the Bureau’s account of what happened was implausible.  
The court also found that the documentation provided by Pittman was sufficient to 
present a factual dispute about whether Pittman was given the opportunity to present 
witnesses and have a staff representative, and whether he made those requests at the 
hearing before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer.  The court consolidated the two petitions 
under the same case number, and remanded the case to the Magistrate Judge for further 
proceedings.   
 The Magistrate Judge appointed the Federal Community Defender Association to 
represent Pittman, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for February 24, 2011.  Before 
the hearing took place, however, the Bureau of Prisons conducted administrative re-
hearings for both challenged disciplinary incidents.  The Unit Hearings occurred on 
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January 14, 2011 where the Warden assigned a staff representative to assist Pittman at the 
disciplinary hearings which were held on January 31, 2011.   
 After the hearing on the “handcuff incident,” the Disciplinary Hearing Officer 
found Pittman guilty of assaulting the correctional officer, relying on the correctional 
officer’s statement and noting that the officer had no reason to lie while Pittman did.  The 
Hearing Officer also relied on supporting memos from other correctional officers and 
medical documentation supporting the correctional officer’s injury.  Finally, the Hearing 
Officer relied upon Pittman’s own statement that “When one of the cuffs was removed, I 
took advantage and admit that I did in fact pull away which caused the officer’s injury to 
his hand.”   
 At the disciplinary hearing for the “spitting incident,” Pittman denied spitting on 
the correctional officer and using a racial slur.  The Disciplinary Hearing Officer, 
however, found otherwise, again observing that the correctional officer had no reason to 
lie while Pittman did.   
 Over Pittman’s objection, the Magistrate Judge granted the Bureau of Prisons’ 
motion to cancel the evidentiary hearing, finding that the re-hearings had caused the 
issues involving possible due process violations in the initial misconduct proceedings to 
have become moot.  The Magistrate Judge ordered counsel to submit a brief in support of 
a grant of habeas relief or to file an amended petition.  Pittman filed an amended petition 
and supporting brief to which the Bureau of Prisons responded.   
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the amended habeas petition be denied 
because Pittman had received the due process rights afforded by Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).  The 
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Magistrate Judge also found that Pittman’s claim of prejudice caused by the delay in 
having the second hearing did not rise to a due process violation.  Following a de novo 
review, the District Court overruled Pittman’s timely-filed objections and denied the 
amended habeas petition, finding that there were no Wolff or Hill
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and 
“exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to its findings of fact.”  
 due process violations, 
that the delay did not amount to a due process violation, and that there was some 
evidence in the record to support the decisions of the Hearing Officer.  Pittman appealed. 
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“review of the district court’s Order denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is 
plenary”).  A complaint challenging the loss of good-time credits is cognizable under § 
2241.  Queen v. Miner
 Pittman concedes that the administrative re-hearings offered a certain measure of 
satisfaction of the procedural requirements.  He argues, however, that the two-year delay 
in affording him the constitutionally required administrative procedure in connection with 
the disciplinary infractions constituted a denial of due process.  Pittman contends that the 
delay resulted in a loss of evidence, including videotapes of the two incidents, the release 
from prison of one of his potential witnesses, and the inability of another potential 
witness to recall the incident.   
, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 The Bureau of Prisons is responsible for administering the Federal Prison System 
which includes the discipline of inmates.  See 18 U.S.C. § 4042.  Prison disciplinary 
proceedings are not treated the same as a criminal prosecution, and the entire range of 
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rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not apply in prison disciplinary 
proceedings.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.  Prisoners are, however, guaranteed certain due 
process protections, especially when faced with the loss of good time credits against their 
prison sentence as a result of prison misconduct.  Id. at 564-565.  The minimum required 
protections include: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an 
opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call 
witnesses and present documentary evidence in the prisoner’s defense; and (3) a written 
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 
action.  Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567).  Revocation of good 
time does not comport with “the minimum requirements of procedural due process,” 
unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by “some evidence in 
the record.”  Id.  Thus, the decision of a Disciplinary Hearing Officer is entitled to 
considerable deference by a reviewing court.  If there is “some evidence” to support the 
decision of the hearing examiner, the court must reject any evidentiary challenge 
presented by the prisoner.  Id.
 We agree with the District Court that Pittman was afforded the protections 
required for procedural due process in the context of prison disciplinary hearings and that 
the delay in conducting the re-hearings did not violate Pittman’s due process rights.  
Pittman himself concedes that he was afforded the assistance of a staff representative, the 
right to present witness testimony, and the right to present documentary evidence.  
Furthermore, there exists some evidence in the record to support the decisions of the 
Disciplinary Hearing Officer.  In finding that Pittman had committed the offense charged 
in the “handcuff incident,” the Hearing Officer based his decision upon the statement of 
 at 457.   
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the correctional officer.  He also took into consideration Pittman’s admission that he had 
taken advantage of the situation in which one of his hands was handcuffed when he 
pulled away causing injury to the officer’s hand.  In finding that Pittman had committed 
the offenses charged in the “spitting incident,” the Hearing Officer also based his 
decision upon the statement of the correctional officer, finding that the officer was 
credible because he had no reason to lie about the incident and Pittman did.   
 We also agree with the District Court that Pittman was not prejudiced by the 
delay.  Pittman’s contentions lack any proof that the delay in conducting the re-hearings 
played any role in the outcome of the disciplinary adjudications.  One of Pittman’s 
potential witnesses indicated that he did not know anyone by the name “Pittman,” but had 
he been provided with a nickname or some additional information, he might have had 
“something to say.”  The witness had no recollection of the “handcuff incident,” contrary 
to Pittman’s contention.  In addition, Pittman complains that another potential witness 
was released from prison approximately ten months after the “handcuff incident” and was 
therefore unavailable at the re-hearing.  The District Court properly found that the Bureau 
of Prisons should not be held to have prejudiced Pittman by the unavailability of a 
potential witness where Pittman did not mention the witness by name in his habeas 
petition.  Pittman also claimed that a fellow inmate had witnessed the “spitting incident.”  
That witness testified, however, that he was not physically in the area of the “spitting 
incident,” and therefore observed nothing.  Thus, the passage of time would have had no 
bearing on this witness’s testimony.  In addition, as found by the District Court, there was 
no evidence that Pittman had requested that witness testimony or any evidence be 
presented on his behalf at the original hearings held within weeks of the incidents.  No 
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colorable showing was offered that the putative witnesses would have provided testimony 
that could have caused a different adjudication had the delay not occurred. 
 Finally, Pittman insists that prison video cameras recorded both of the incidents on 
videotape but the delay resulted in the videotape’s unavailability.  The District Court 
properly found, however, that such evidence did not exist, and based its finding on 
uncontroverted reports from the prison staff describing the limited capability of the fixed 
cameras near where the incidents occurred.  These reports showed that it was impossible 
for the video cameras to have captured the incidents.  The passage of time would thus 
have had no impact on this lack of evidence.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Order of the District Court. 
 
